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NOTES AND COMMENT
Wills Murder of Testatrix by Beneficiary.-The recently decided
case of In re Wilkins Estate presented to our court for the first time
a question, which, though decided before in other jurisdictions, occurs
so infrequently that it has not lost its novel interest. The facts are
simple enough: A, the testatrix, was murdered by B, who immediately
thereafter committed suicide. By the terms of A's will, B was to re-
ceive $5,ooo. The case is unique in that B had no knowledge that he
was a beneficiary; this peculiar characteristic distinguishes this case
from others decided elsewhere because it is apparent that fear on B's
part that a change might be made in the will or that perhaps he might
be left out entirely, was not the -motivating force which impelled him
to commit the crime.
Of course, the court held that the murderer could not take under the
will, yet the reasons for so holding as given in the opinion which is
written by Justice Doerfler, are somewhat different than might be ex-
pected. To be sure, the court held that the equitable doctrine that a
man shall not profit by his own wrong was applicable here, yet the
court lays down very emphatically and gives as one of its chief reasons
for its decision that the fact that the testatrix was not given an oppor-
tunity to change her will if she so desired, made it imperative as to B.
This in accordance with section 238.14 of the Statutes, "the power to
make a will implies the power to revoke the same."
In advancing this argument, the court goes on to say that if the
testatrix had lived "a reasonable time after the commission of the
offense and during such time retains her competency to make a new
will or to revoke or modify the one already made, but fails or refuses
to make a change the will nevertheless becomes effective."
The leading case in the country on this subject in this country is
Riggs v. Palmer,2 which was later fully interpreted in the prominent
case of Ellerson v. Westcott.3 In the Riggs case, a grandson murdered
his grandfather to prevent the latter from revoking a will in which he
was the principal devisee; as explained in Ellerson v. Westcott, the
court did not revoke the will in the Riggs case, but rather exercised its
equity jurisdiction, and forced the criminal to surrender his ill-gotten
title. In this connection, difficulties arise, and our court in the instant
case realized them. Does the will become operative immediately at the
death of the testator, or is it revoked, and if so, by what process?
A further problem follows the second supposition when the statutes
prescribe only certain methods by which a will may be revoked, and
no mention is made of instances where a beneficiary murders the testa-
tor. That is the situation in both New York and Wisconsin.
The New York court insists that the will becomes operative at the
death of the testator but that the beneficiary B "caused that death, and
thus by crime made it speak and have operation. Shall it speak and
operate in his favor?4 Before the Ellerson case, the legal remedy
1 212 N.W. 652, Wis.
2 I5 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188, 5 L.tRA. 340, 12 Am. St. Rep. 319.
148 N.Y. 149, 42 N.E. 540.
'Riggs v. Palmer, see 2.
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was only considered. As Mr. Ames says, 5 "All overlooked that bene-
ficent principle in our law by which equity, acting in personam, compels
one who by misconduct has acquired a res at common law, to hold the
res as a constructive trustee for person wronged, or if he is dead, for
his representatives."
Our court seems somewhat hesitant in so extending equitable juris-
diction to this case. While recognizing the equitable principle that one
may not profit by his own wrong, yet the distinction is made that if this
equitable doctrine applies, the vesting and the taking of the property are
separable acts and that once title was vested "there is visited upon the
criminal a punishment in addition to that provided for by law. In
other words, it amounts to an attainder or a corruption of the blood,
prohibited by the Constitution," while the two actions are really simul-
taneous. The decision then rests upon the theory that the will may be
considered revoked insofar as B is concerned, and still be within the
blanket statute 238.14 "that nothing contained in this section shall pre-
vent the revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in the con-
dition or circumstances of the testator." (Italics ours.) As stated
In re Will of Battis, in explaining how the case is brought within the
exception, "the rule rests on the idea that the changed conditions and
circumstances of the testator respecting his property, his family, or
beneficiaries, imposing different moral and legal duties, affords strong
evidence that the testator intended that his will should become revoked
as to the provisions affected by such subsequent change."
In a word, then, the rule seems to be that a beneficiary who murders
his testator, causes, within the contemplation of the legislature, a
revocation of the will as to him, and that in addition to that controlling
reason in the case, a county court may exercise equitable jurisdiction
in construing a will by preventing a wrongful actor from realizing
profit from his own wrong. The mere fact that the actor did not know
he was a beneficiary is immaterial.
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Wills: Precatory Words Held Sufficient to Create Trust.-Wis-
consin has added another to its list of precatory phrases that are suffi-
ciently expressive of the intention of the testator to create a trust. In
the case of In re Doe's Will' the testator left practically all of his
property to his wife "well knowing" that she would make wise use
thereof and would leave the residue to the children of their marriage.
There is nothing startling about this decision for the same words have
been held to create a trust in various other jurisdictions. Nriggs v.
Penny aid Bardswell v. Bardswell2 had previously adjudicated upon
these exact words.
Can a murderer acquire a title and keep it? Ames' Lectures on Legal History,
p. 310.
143 Wis. 234, 126 N.W. 9.
(Wis.), 212 N.W. 781.
'49 Eng. Ch. 4.
249 Eng. Ch. 4, 9 Sim. 319.
